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I. INTRODUCTION
As California’s record-breaking drought enters its fourth year, the demand
1
for groundwater resources only increases. Business is booming for well drilling
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2016; B.A.
Philosophy, San Francisco State University, 2013. Special thanks to Professor Jennifer Harder for being a
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companies as California’s Central Valley agricultural industry continues to rely
2
on the water running underneath the earth’s surface. For example, in Fresno,
Arthur & Orum Well Drilling, Inc. maintains a waiting list that is over a year
3
long. Meanwhile, researchers have demonstrated that over-reliance on
groundwater resources leads to adverse and irreversible environmental effects,
4
including groundwater overdraft and land subsidence. To address this
troublesome predicament, in late 2014, California lawmakers came together with
the goal of making California’s groundwater management sustainable and
5
enacted the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).
As eminently laudable and sensible as SGMA may be, when viewed against
the backdrop of the existing groundwater regulation framework, the legislation
6
raises important questions. Does the jurisdictional shift contained within the new
legislation unfairly upset the expectations of water right holders and property
7
owners? If so, does this shift result in a “taking” of private property without just
compensation within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
8
Constitution?
The development of the law surrounding groundwater management,
allocation, and conservation in California has been a power struggle rife with plot
twists. Lawmakers, advocates, rights holders, and members of the public have
debated for decades about the degree of ultimate oversight that the state should
9
possess over groundwater. Now, as new laws demand sustainable use and grant
powers that the state once lacked, a look back through California’s groundwater
10
saga provides the context necessary to understand its newest chapter.
The State Water Resources Control Board (“the Board”) is a state entity that
oversees and protects California’s water resources and administers the California

1. Lesley Stahl, Depleting the Water, CBS NEWS, Nov. 16, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
depleting-the-water/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Devin Galloway & Francis S. Riley, San Joaquin Valley, California: Largest Human Alteration of
the Earth’s Surface, 1182 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. CIRCULAR 23 (1999) (demonstrating the connection
between groundwater over-draft and land subsidence, an irreversible environmental alteration that has many
adverse effects on property).
5. See infra Part III (outlining the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and the push for
sustainability in general).
6. See infra Part IV (detailing the questions raised by SGMA).
7. See id (posing that question).
8. See infra Part IV.C (dealing with the takings question).
9. Reid Wilson, California Debates New Regulations for Diminishing Groundwater Amid Historic
Drought, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/08/06/californiadebates-new-regulations-for-diminishing-groundwater-amid-historic-drought/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
10. See infra Parts II–III (outlining the long history of the Board’s jurisdiction and the latest step in its
expansion).
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11

permitting system. Section 1200 of the California Water Code establishes the
12
parameters of SWRCB’s jurisdiction. The statute provides: “whenever the terms
stream, lake, or other body of water . . . occurs in relation to [applications,
permits, or licenses to appropriate], such terms refer only to surface water, and to
13
subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.” As a
result, pumping from “subterranean streams” is subject to the SWRCB’s
14
permitting authority, but groundwater that does not flow through a “known and
15
definite channel” is not subject to the SWRCB’s permitting authority. This latter
category is known as “percolating groundwater,” and common law principles and
16
the courts regulate the use of such water, rather than the SWRCB.
Also relevant to the discussion is Article X, Section 2 of the California
17
18
Constitution. In pertinent part, the constitutional amendment mandates that
“the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use,” and “that the
conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and
19
beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare.”
The text also grants the legislature power to “enact laws in the furtherance of the
20
policy” it sets forth. Commentators have argued that Article X, Section 2 was an
21
expansion of state jurisdiction over groundwater rights; this Comment will
demonstrate that, in fact, there has been a clear trend of increased oversight
powers notwithstanding the “subterranean stream” limitation of Water Code
22
Section 1200. The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act further expands
the Board’s jurisdiction over percolating groundwater, expressly relying on the
11. See About the Water Board, CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., http://www.swrcb.ca.gov
/about_us/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (displaying the
mission statement of the Board: “To preserve, enhance, and restore the quality of California’s water resources
and drinking water for the protection of the environment, public health, and all beneficial uses, and to ensure
proper water resource allocation and efficient use, for the benefit of present and future generations.”).
12. CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 2015) [hereinafter “Section 1200”].
13. Id.
14. See Water Rights: Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., http://water
boards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_info/faqs.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Frequently Asked
Questions] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that “[i]f you have a pre-1914
[appropriative] right, you do not need a water right permit,” implying that post-1914 appropriative rights are
subject to the Board’s permitting jurisdiction).
15. Andrew H. Sawyer, Subterranean Blues: Groundwater Classification in California, 6 CAL. WATER
L. SYMP. 1, 15 (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.ourstreamsflow.org/documents/Subterranean
%20streams_1.pdf) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. Id. at 3
17. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 269, 308 (2002) (noting that attorneys for the Board have argued that Article X, Section 2 of
the State Constitution allows for the Board’s jurisdiction to include unreasonably used groundwater).
22. See infra Part II.B.4 (describing the trend of increased Board jurisdictional authority over
groundwater).
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23

legislature’s prerogative under Article X, Section 2. Under SGMA, the Board
will have the ability to limit pumping to achieve sustainability under
circumstances that previously would have been within courts’ exclusive
24
jurisdiction. If this jurisdictional shift amounts to a taking of private property
for public use within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, then water rights
holders should receive just compensation. Likewise, if SGMA’s pumping limits
require private property owners to bear a burden that is properly borne by the
public as a whole, then water right holders should receive just compensation.
Unfortunately for opponents of SGMA’s passage, existing California law would
likely render a facial takings claim unsuccessful. There are, however, certain
limited factual scenarios where application of SGMA could create a claim for
just compensation.
To reach those conclusions, Part II of this Comment explores the current
25
framework of the Board’s jurisdiction over groundwater. Part III describes the
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, passed in late 2014, and the
26
jurisdictional changes contained within that Act. Part IV addresses questions
raised by the Act about whether the expanded Board jurisdiction therein is
consistent with the protections against uncompensated takings contained within
27
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Finally, assuming that the
expansion of the Board’s jurisdiction implicates a takings question, the remainder
of this Comment explores whether a takings claim should be recognized if the
28
Board exercises the new authority granted by SGMA to restrict pumping.
II. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE OF THE
BOARD’S JURISDICTION
A statutory framework interpreted by decades of case law governs the power
of the Board to limit the pumping of groundwater resources; this framework
makes it clear that the Board has limited regulatory jurisdiction over
29
groundwater. This Section examines two of the most distinct aspects of the
Board’s jurisdiction over groundwater. First, this Section outlines why the Board

23. See infra Part IV.A (concluding that the legislature has expanded Board jurisdiction).
24. Id.
25. See infra Part II (demonstrating the current limitations on the Board’s jurisdiction).
26. See infra Part III (outlining the basics of the powers granted to the Board by the Act and the
legislation related to it).
27. See infra Part IV.C (answering this question in detail).
28. See infra Part IV.C.3 (recognizing that a facial takings claim against SGMA as a whole will likely
prove unsuccessful, but also noting that California should recognize two specific “as applied” takings
arguments).
29. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200–1202 (limiting the Board’s regulatory jurisdiction to
subterranean streams); see also Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 119, 141 (1903) (a case interpreting that
framework and holding against regulatory jurisdiction over percolating groundwater).
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30

only has jurisdiction over certain types of groundwater rights. Then, this Section
explores four developing areas of groundwater law that have expanded the
Board’s ability to regulate groundwater usage and pumping under certain
31
circumstances. In doing so, this section will outline the general parameters of
the Board’s jurisdiction over groundwater in California and demonstrate its
32
expansion.
A. Only Some Groundwater
The California Water Code and the courts interpreting it have together
created a distinction between percolating groundwater and subterranean
33
34
streams. Percolating groundwater is “water held in the earth,” and is not
subject to the provisions of the Water Code addressing jurisdiction over
35
groundwater. Because percolating groundwater typically exists in the soil of an
36
overlying landowner’s property, it was historically considered “open for
37
exploitation.” Thus, in the past, courts would say that “no law will prevent or
38
interfere with” its extraction. However, as the law evolved, courts began to
recognize that percolating groundwater is not a purely private property right and
39
that the state may regulate its use in some circumstances.
In contrast, subterranean streams are waters that move underground “in
40
channels with definite beds and banks . . . in definite streams.” Because the law
41
subjects water found in a definite channel to appropriation, and due to Water
42
Code Section 1200’s unambiguous language, the Board possesses clear
43
jurisdiction over subterranean streams. Section 1200 of the Water Code

30. See infra Part II.A (outlining the difference between percolating groundwater and subterranean
streams, and the role that difference plays in determining whether the Board has jurisdiction to regulate).
31. See infra Parts II.B.1–4 (addressing these potential limitations).
32. See id. (demonstrating the trend).
33. Katz, 141 Cal. at 141.
34. Id.
35. See CAL. WATER CODE §1200 (stating that the Code applies only to “surface water” and
“subterranean streams,” while explicitly not mentioning the percolating groundwater in the soil).
36. See Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, 222 (1886) (holding that “[w]ater percolating in the soil belongs to the
owner of the freehold.”).
37. Katz, 141 Cal. at 128.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., id. at 134 (noting that percolating groundwater use must be “reasonable”).
40. Wells A. Hutchins, California Groundwater: Legal Problems, 45 CAL. L. REV. 688 (1953).
41. See CAL. WATER CODE §1201 (stating that “[a]ll water flowing in any natural channel” that has not
already been put to beneficial use is “public water of the State and subject to appropriation in accordance with
[the Water Code].”).
42. See id. § 1200 (conferring jurisdiction to the Board over subterranean streams).
43. See, e.g., North Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1583
(2006) (noting that the Board argued that the groundwater in question belonged to a subterranean stream, and
was thus “subject to [its] jurisdiction.”).
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expressly grants jurisdiction over the use of such waters, stating that “whenever
the [term] . . . water occurs in relation to applications to appropriate water or
permits or licenses to such applications, such term refers only to surface water,
44
and to subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.”
The judiciary has affirmed a legal test that the Board devised for classifying
45
groundwater as either percolating or part of a subterranean stream. Pursuant to
this test, a watercourse is a subterranean stream, and therefore subject to the
Board’s jurisdiction, when (1) a “subsurface channel [is] present;” (2) that
“channel [has] a relatively impermeable bed and banks;” (3) “the course of the
channel [is] known or capable of being determined by reasonable inference;” and
46
(4) there is groundwater “flowing in the channel.” This framework limits the
scope of the Board’s jurisdiction, because if a party can successfully demonstrate
that a given source of groundwater is percolating, then prior to enactment of
SGMA, the Board arguably has little, if any, authority over groundwater
47
pumping.
B. Limited Regulatory Jurisdiction over Percolating Groundwater
This section explores four of the most important contours of the Board’s
jurisdiction over groundwater prior to the enactment of SGMA. Subpart 1
explains the Board’s permitting and regulatory jurisdiction, the two possible
48
sources of authority to limit groundwater extraction. Subpart 2 looks at the
Water Code’s water quality provisions and the limits they place on the Board’s
49
jurisdiction. Subpart 3 examines how courts have employed the public trust
50
doctrine to regulate groundwater in some situations. Finally, Subpart 4
examines how the legislature and the Board itself have expanded Board
jurisdiction by relying largely on Article X, Section 2 of the California
51
Constitution.
1. Permitting vs. Regulatory Jurisdiction
California groundwater law requires water users who pump from a
subterranean stream to obtain a permit from the Board before pumping or
diverting a supply of water, but the law does not require water users who pump

44. WATER § 1200.
45. North Gualala, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1585.
46. Id.
47. See id. (implying that the Board’s jurisdiction is not absolute because of the distinction between
percolating groundwater and subterranean streams).
48. See infra Part II.B.1.
49. See infra Part II.B.2.
50. See infra Part II.B.3.
51. See infra Part II.B.4.

30

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
52

percolating groundwater to obtain any Board permit. This limited permitting
authority begs a question left almost untouched by California’s judiciary: does
the Board’s power to grant permits for water use differ from its power to regulate
water use?
No court has directly addressed that issue, although one recent case is
relevant: in Light v. State Water Resources Control Board, the Board issued a
53
regulation prohibiting certain uses of surface water on the basis that such use
54
was unreasonably and adversely affecting local aquatic habitat. Multiple surface
water users sued, asserting that the Board lacked jurisdiction over their riparian
55
and pre-1914 appropriative surface water rights. Despite the fact that the Water
Code establishes that the Board does not have permitting authority over riparian
and pre-1914 water rights, the court held that “if . . . the [l]egislature has the
power to enact general rules governing the reasonable use of water, the Board has
56
a similar regulatory authority” pursuant to Article X, Section 2. In doing so, the
court rejected the argument that the Board’s authority is limited to enforcement
actions and instead reasoned on policy grounds that “[e]fficient regulation of the
state’s water resources . . . demands that the Board have the authority to enact
57
tailored regulations.”
Although the Light holding only applies to riparian and early appropriator
surface rights, and not groundwater rights, the holding can be extended by
analogy to groundwater. For all three types of water rights, the Water Code
58
establishes a lack of Board jurisdiction; likewise, for all three types of water
59
rights, Article X, Section 2 imposes a duty of reasonableness. Light’s citation to
the broad role of the Board, and the court’s concern for efficient regulation
60
applies equally to percolating groundwater as to riparian and pre-1914 rights.
Light suggests that it is possible to have a water right that is subject to the
Board’s regulatory power, but not to the Board’s permitting authority—a concept
61
rarely invoked prior to the case.
52. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200, 1221.
53. See Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1472 (2014) (explaining that
landowners were diverting the water flowing through a stream and using it to irrigate local vineyards and
orchards).
54. Id.
55. See id. (explaining the plaintiffs’ argument that they were exempt from Board jurisdiction due to their
possession of groundwater rights as “riparian users and early appropriators, whose diversion is beyond the
permitting authority of the Board.”).
56. See id. at 1484–85 (stating that “[t]he Water Code authorizes the Board, in carrying out its statutory
duty to administer the state’s water resources, ‘to exercise the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the
state.’”).
57. Id. at 1487.
58. Id.
59. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
60. See Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1487.
61. See id. at 1472–73 (referring to permitting and regulatory jurisdiction as two separate possible sources
of power over water resources).
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Despite the Light court’s suggestion that permitting and regulatory authority
are not necessarily co-extensive, practicalities and policy suggest a more nuanced
analysis. As a practical matter, permitting requires a water user to do two things:
(1) to affirmatively obtain permission to divert water and (2) to comply with the
62
terms and conditions that the Board may impose. In contrast, a regulatory
process without permitting requires a water user to comply with Board rules, but
63
only after the water user establishes a water right. In both cases, a water user’s
property interest in water is subject to Board rules. In the end, what matters to
groundwater pumpers is whether the Board may compel them to limit pumping,
64
which it may do regardless of whether it has permitting jurisdiction. In this
regard, exercise of regulatory jurisdiction overwhelms the absence of permitting
authority, leaving the question of why the legislature failed to grant such
authority in the first place.
As a policy matter, a legal structure that has no upfront permitting
requirement, but nonetheless allows regulation of use after the fact, seems to be a
recipe for poor planning, chaos, and discontentment. Without a permit
requirement, a water user may invest in pumping and rely on pumped water, but
thereafter be limited or excluded from realizing that investment due to a
regulatory action by the Board. This scenario is arguably inefficient from an
economic, social, and water resource perspective. However, the courts may
nonetheless trend in the direction of upholding Board jurisdiction, as in Light,
simply because, without legislative action, management of percolating
groundwater basins would continue to be subject to the vagaries of local
resources and influences—a practicality that was a driving force behind SGMA.
2. Water Quality Regulation
In 1969, the California legislature enacted a suite of laws to ensure
65
heightened water quality standards. One of those provisions, Water Code
Section 2100, gave the Board the authority to file suit in court in order to limit
66
pumping to protect groundwater quality. Notably, the Board could not impose
such pumping cuts directly, much like the scope of authority granted to the Board
67
under other Water Code provisions. The Board has never in fact filed such
62. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 14.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1487 (noting that the right holders were outside permitting
jurisdiction but nonetheless fell within the rules regarding reasonableness).
65. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2100–2102.
66. Id. § 2100 (“the board may file an action in the superior court to restrict pumping, or to impose
physical solutions, or both, to the extent necessary to prevent destruction of or irreparable injury to the quality
of [groundwater].”)
67. See, e.g., id. § 275 (stating that “[t]he department and board shall take all appropriate proceedings or
actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable
method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water in this state”).
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adjudication, although there are some examples of the Board invoking its Section
68
2100 authority in an effort to compel local action.
3. The Public Trust Doctrine
With roots stretching back to English common law, the public trust doctrine
imposes an obligation on the state to protect navigable and tidally influenced
69
waters for common use by the public. In the touchstone case, National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of California held that state water
70
right allocation must ensure protection of trust uses where feasible. The Court
also held that as a matter of logic, this obligation extends to non-navigable
71
streams where water use and diversion affect navigable watercourses. Under
this reasoning, the Board’s authority to protect the public trust might extend to
percolating groundwater, at least where pumping impacts navigable or tidally
72
influenced water subject to the trust.
The recent case of Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources
73
Control Board addressed that precise issue. There, the petitioner alleged that
groundwater pumping had diminished the flow of the Scott River, damaging fish
populations and decreasing opportunities for recreational activities like boating
74
and swimming. In July 2014, addressing a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the superior court issued an opinion holding that where pumping
causes harm to navigable waters, the public trust doctrine allows the Board to
75
restrict pumping in order to protect those waters held in the public trust. It is
important to keep in mind that this was a superior court holding, and thus, it has
76
limited value as of yet. However, the decision does represent a willingness to
move closer to regulating groundwater not previously within the government’s
reach. Judicial receptiveness to the application of the public trust doctrine to

68. See, e.g., STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., RESOLUTION NO. 88-114, RESOLUTION CALLING FOR
JOINT ACTION BY FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES TO REMEDY CONTAMINATION IN THE MAIN SAN
GABRIEL GROUND WATER BASIN (1988).
69. Hope M. Babcock, The Public Trust Doctrine: What a Tall Tale They Tell, 61 S.C. L. REV. 393, 396–
97 (2009).
70. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 426 (1983).
71. Id. at 437.
72. See, e.g., Press Release, Envtl. Law Found., Court Rules Groundwater Protected as Public Trust (July
16, 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (advocating the use of the public trust
doctrine to proscribe use of groundwater resources where pumping causes harm to waters protected by the
public trust).
73. Order after Hearing on Cross Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings at 2, Envtl. Law Found. v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34–2010–80000583 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014), 2014 WL 8843074.
74. Id. at 3–4.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id at 1.
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groundwater resources is part of a trend toward broader Board authority to
77
regulate groundwater use.
4. Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution
78

Enacted by voters in 1928, Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution mandates a standard of “reasonable” use, stating that “the right to
water or to the use . . . of water . . . is and shall be limited to such water as shall
be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not
79
and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use.” Article X, Section 2 also
requires that “the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the
80
fullest extent of which they are capable.” Although Article X, Section 2 is selfexecuting, the Water Code authorizes the Board to take measures necessary to
81
“prevent . . . unreasonable use.” The exact scope of the authority that Article X,
82
Section 2 grants is unclear. Given this ambiguity, water interests clash over the
question of whether the constitutional provision provides sufficient regulatory
power to the Board to give the Board jurisdiction over certain water rights—such
as rights to percolating groundwater—which the Board otherwise clearly does
83
not have jurisdiction.
Despite this ambiguity, the Board has in fact invoked Article X, Section 2 to
assert regulatory jurisdiction over rights that would not otherwise be within its
84
85
jurisdiction. California’s judiciary has thus far upheld such Board action,
although it could be argued that the few cases that exist are limited to their facts.
86
One of the first cases to convey this type of reasoning is SWRCB v. Forni.
There, without reference to the constitutional provision, the court found that the
constitutional and statutory requirements of reasonable and beneficial use applied
87
to a riparian right holder. In reaching the decision to uphold the Board’s action,
the court relied heavily on Water Code Section 275, and ultimately held that the
77. See id. at 13. (paving the way and bolstering the argument for such an expansion).
78. Bryan E. Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225 (1989).
79. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
80. Id.
81. CAL. WATER CODE § 275; see, e.g., Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 186 Cal.
App. 3d 1160, 1163 (1986) (stating that “the Board has adjudicatory power in the matter of unreasonable use of
water”).
82. Sax, supra note 21, at 313.
83. Id. at 308.
84. People ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743 (1976); Imperial Irrigation,
186 Cal. App. 3d at 1163 (1986); Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1487 (2014).
85. See, e.g., Imperial Irrigation, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1163 (stating that “the Board has adjudicatory
power in the matter of unreasonable use of water.”); Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1473 (following the same
logic).
86. 54 Cal. App. 3d 743 (1976).
87. Id. at 752–53.
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code section confers an affirmative power to the Board that allows it to “bring an
88
action in which the reasonableness of . . . water use could be adjudicated.”
Water Code Section 275 states that the “board shall take all appropriate
proceedings or actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to
prevent waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable
89
method of diversion of water in this state.” However, the court substantially
rested its decision on the fact that the Board was exercising only the power to
90
bring the action to court, and not to direct regulation.
Courts became more overtly supportive to the idea of broader Board
jurisdiction over unreasonable uses over time: a decade after Forni, the court in
Imperial Irrigation District v. SWRCB addressed whether the Board’s
determination that a water district’s failure to implement conservation measures
constituted unreasonable use was binding on the District, despite the fact that the
91
district held pre-1914 rights. Ultimately, the court held that the Board has
92
adjudicatory power as to unreasonable water use. Rather than relying on Section
93
275, the court based this notion on Article X, Section 2. The Imperial Irrigation
decision appears to be the earliest direct authority for Board exercise of broad
regulatory jurisdiction over the question of reasonable use under Article X,
Section 2. The Imperial Irrigation court, however, never grounded its decision in
any specific legal authority other than the desirability of the Board wielding
94
comprehensive power over the question of reasonable use.
Despite this slim foundation, the idea of broad Board authority under Article
X, Section 2 appears to be trending toward acceptance. Nearly forty years after
Forni, the court in Light again questioned whether the Board had the authority to
95
enact regulations concerning unreasonable use. Unlike Forni, Light considered
whether the Board imposed the regulation directly on the water user rather than
relying on a court process (although the regulation itself was fairly restrained,
requiring the water users to develop their own management plans rather than the
96
Board imposing plans on them). The Light petitioners argued that in adopting
this regulation, the Board had exceeded its authority under Water Code Section
275 to bring actions before the judiciary, legislature, and other administrative
agencies. Thus, the Light court was squarely focused on the scope of the Board’s

88. Id. at 753.
89. CAL. WATER CODE § 275.
90. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 754.
91. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 1162–63 (1986).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1472–73.
96. Compare id. at 1472 (dealing with a Board regulation on unreasonable use) with SWRCB v. Forni, 54
Cal. App. 3d 743 (1976) (addressing whether the Board could bring an action concerning unreasonable use, and
concluding that such action comes within the express language of Water Code section 275).
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jurisdiction under Article X, Section 2. The court held that the constitutional
provision confers broad jurisdiction, and by specifying that the Board could take
actions to court, Section 275 simply outlined one approach that the Board could
98
take and did not limit other approaches. Invoking Imperial Irrigation’s broad
principles, the Light court held that the Board has the “authority to prevent . . .
99
unreasonable use of water, regardless of the basis under which the right is held.”
The Light opinion stated that Article X, Section 2 confers upon the Board a
“separate and additional power” from that given in Section 275 “to take whatever
100
steps are necessary to prevent unreasonable use.” The court also relied upon
Water Code Section 174, which grants the Board the power to “exercise the
adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the state in the field of water
101
resources,” and Section 186, which affords the Board “any powers . . . that may
102
be necessary or convenient for the exercise of its duties authorized by law.”
Although these holdings are potentially very powerful, it is notable that their
reasoning is rather thin. For instance, the court in the Imperial Irrigation case
grounded the Board’s regulatory power over pre-1914 rights—rights over which
the Board otherwise does not have jurisdiction—in Article X, Section 2 and in so
103
doing, referenced several provisions of the Water Code. However, neither
Article X, Section 2 nor those Water Code provisions specifically grant the
Board jurisdiction over pre-1914 rights, and arguably, the very general language
of these provisions fails to support the argument that they were intended to alter
jurisdiction. Moreover, neither the Light court nor the Imperial Irrigation court
presents a convincing legal argument for such a change, as sound as their policy
104
rationales might be. Of course, these decisions are binding and courts are
unlikely to reverse them.
Despite their thin legal underpinning, the ultimate conclusion of these
cases—that consistent and comprehensive regulation of water resources is most
desirable regardless of a lack of legislative clarity on the issue—seems eminently
sensible. Perhaps for this reason, if not for any other, Article X, Section 2 is
increasingly invoked as a source of Board power, even over water rights to which
97. See 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1481–82 (lacking other grounds to uphold the regulation, the court relied
heavily on the expansive language of the constitutional provision and the fact that Board jurisdiction “has
steadily evolved from the narrow role of deciding priorities between competing appropriators to the charge of
comprehensive planning and allocation of waters”).
98. Id. at 1495.
99. Id. at 1487.
100. Id. at 1486.
101. CAL. WATER CODE § 174.
102. Id. § 186.
103. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 1169–70
(1986) (citing to California Water Code Sections 275 and 1050 for the proposition that “the Board has the
‘separate and additional power to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent unreasonable use”) (quoting
United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 142 (1986) (emphasis in original)).
104. See, e.g., WATER § 100 (cited by the Imperial Irrigation court, and mandating a statewide water
policy but not mentioning the constitutional provision).
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it otherwise does not have jurisdiction. In this regard, twenty-five years ago,
one commentator characterized Article X, Section 2 as “something of a sleeping
giant, which may be awakened in future years as water grows shorter in supply
106
and the interest in water conservation increases.” After a century-long nap, the
giant may finally be awake. In 2014, the legislature invoked Article X, Section 2
to confer substantial new powers on the Board in the groundbreaking Sustainable
107
Groundwater Management Act.
III. NEW GROUNDWATER LEGISLATION: INTRODUCING SUSTAINABLE
STANDARDS
During their 2013–2014 legislative session, California lawmakers recognized
several problems connected to the state’s reliance on groundwater resources
during dry years, including the ability of most groundwater users to pump at an
108
unregulated rate. In response to these problems, the legislature passed three
bills related to sustainable local groundwater management that Governor Jerry
Brown later signed into law; collectively, these three bills make up the
109
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act. SGMA is a groundbreaking effort
110
111
to mandate sustainable groundwater use, so as to avoid “over-drafting” the
112
state’s already-depleted water supplies.
The Act primarily focuses on the roles of local groundwater management
entities and finds that “groundwater resources are most effectively managed at
the local or regional level” and that “groundwater management will not be
105. See, e.g., Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1473 (citing to the constitutional provision to support regulation
of unreasonable uses).
106. Gray, supra note 78, at 226.
107. SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014).
108. See SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (finding that “[e]xcessive groundwater pumping
can cause overdraft, failed wells, deteriorated water quality, environmental damage, and irreversible land
subsidence . . . .”).
109. AB 1739, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014); SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014);
SB 1319, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (collectively referred to as the Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act).
110. See generally EDMUND G. BROWN, GOVERNOR, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA WATER
ACTION PLAN (2014) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA WATER ACTION PLAN] (advocating for sustainable water use
and “serious groundwater management”); see also Lisa Lien-Mager, Senate Committee Advances Groundwater
Bill, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, April 22, 2014, http://www.acwa.com/news/groundwater/senatecommittee-advances-groundwater-bill (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting Senator
Fran Pavley, author of SB 1168 and SB 1319: “Everyone—literally everyone—seems to be working on
groundwater this year”).
111. See SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (stating that over-draft occurs when a given
basin is pumped at a faster pace than the rate at which it recharges its groundwater supply).
112. See, e.g., Sara Jerome, Water Bills Advance in California Senate, WATER ONLINE, May 14, 2014,
http://www.wateronline.com/doc/water-bills-advance-in-california-senate-0001 (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (stating that “California is pushing up against the limits of our finite water supply,” and
calling the current state of affairs a “water crisis”); see also Galloway, supra note 4 (noting that the
groundwater aquifers in California have been over-pumped for years).
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effective unless local actions to sustainably manage groundwater basins and
113
subbasins are taken.” Consequently, groundwater management entities and
rights holders must now create management plans that specify a “sustainable
114
yield” for the underground basins within their purview, and the basin must be
115
managed to achieve that sustainable level by a deadline. In order to enforce this
mandate, the legislature amended the Water Code to grant new powers to the
116
state through the Board.
It added two main functions to the state’s
117
118
responsibilities: prioritization and enforcement.
Pursuant to the new sustainable groundwater management provisions, the
state now has the authority to prioritize groundwater basins by their depletion
119
levels and risk of overdraft. Management entities in charge of the highest
priority basins will have to create plans more quickly than those that manage
120
lower priority basins. These plans must be designed in a way that achieves a
121
satisfactory result within twenty years.
In order to ensure that management entities actually develop these plans, the
new legislation makes its most impactful change by allowing for Board
enforcement. Upon noncompliance with the new planning requirements and a
122
determination that a basin is probationary, the Board may arrange for a
123
qualified third party to develop a groundwater management plan for the basin.
The Board may adopt such a plan one year after designating a basin as
probationary as long as the specific problems noted during designation have not
124
been addressed and remedied. Ultimately, the Board only has the authority to
rescind its interim plans if it determines that the sustainability plan and the
125
activities moving forward are “adequate.” This could mean indefinite control

113. SB 1168 § 1(a)(6)–(7), 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014).
114. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(v) (enacted by Chapter 346) (defining “sustainable yield” as the
“maximum quantity of water . . . that can be withdrawn annually . . . without causing an undesirable result”).
115. Id. § 10727(a) (enacted by Chapter 346); CAL. WATER CODE § 10726.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 346).
116. See generally AB 1739, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014); SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess.
(Cal. 2014); SB 1319, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (known collectively as SGMA).
117. WATER § 10933(b) (enacted by Chapter 346).
118. Id. § 10735.4(c) (enacted by Chapter 347).
119. Id. § 10933(b) (enacted by Chapter 346).
120. Compare id.§ 10720.7(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 346) with id.§ 10720.7(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter
346) (allowing low-priority basins two more years to adopt sustainability plans than basins of high- and
medium-priority).
121. CAL. WATER CODE § 10727.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 346).
122. See id. § 10735.2 (enacted by Chapter 347) (stating that “the board may . . . designate a basin as a
probationary basin if” any of the listed criteria are met, such as failure to form a management entity by 2017 or
to create a management plan by 2020).
123. Id. § 10735.4(c) (enacted by Chapter 347).
124. Id. §§ 10735.6–8 (enacted by Chapter 347).
125. Id. § 10735.8(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 347).
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over the basins that continually fail to meet the Board’s standards, regardless of
126
the rights held by the entities that operate those basins.
IV. ROUGH WATERS: DOES THE BOARD’S NEW ABILITY TO LIMIT PUMPING
IMPLICATE A TAKINGS CLAIM?
Regulators disagree with users and appropriators about the practical
implications of statewide monitoring, prioritization, and the possibility of
127
intervention. However, the focus of this Comment is not the pros and cons of
the new legislation, but the way in which it expands Board jurisdiction, and
128
whether such expansion creates a takings issue. Therefore, the next section
129
determines whether the legislature has expanded the Board’s jurisdiction. Upon
concluding that the legislature has indeed increased the Board’s jurisdictional
130
scope, the sections thereafter discuss the nature of groundwater rights and the
131
viability of a takings claim.
A. Does SGMA Expand Board Jurisdiction?
The question of whether SGMA expands the Board’s authority in a manner
relevant to a takings analysis depends on whether the Board had the authority to
limit pumping of percolating groundwater rights prior to the enactment of
SGMA. If the Board had that authority, then SGMA did not, as a practical matter,
alter the Board’s ability to regulate percolating groundwater rights—it merely
changed the regulatory framework. From this perspective, Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution provides the best support for the argument that
132
SGMA does not expand the Board’s jurisdiction. The constitutional provision
mandates reasonable and beneficial use of all of California’s water resources,
133
including groundwater. Further, as explored above, at least one court has
recognized the Board’s regulatory authority concerning reasonable uses to be as
134
broad and expansive as possible. These authorities suggest that SGMA has not

126. Id.
127. For a review of those issues, see Micah Green, Article, Chapters 346 and 347: Keeping California’s
Thirst for Groundwater in Check, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 425 (2015) (discussing the practical consequences of
the new groundwater legislation and outlining the arguments on both sides).
128. See infra Part IV.
129. See infra Part IV.A.
130. See infra Part IV.B.
131. See infra Parts IV.C.1–3.
132. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
133. Id.
134. See supra Part II.B.4 (explaining the evolution of the notion that the Board has a regulatory authority
comparable to the legislature when dealing with unreasonable uses).
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expanded Board jurisdiction, because Article X, Section 2 already grants the
135
Board the power to limit unreasonable pumping.
An argument to the contrary might note that prior to SGMA, no court had
addressed the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction. The Light case explored this
issue in more detail than any prior authority, and Light itself did not address
percolating groundwater. Arguably, because no court has ever clearly held that
the pre-SGMA Board had the authority to directly limit percolating groundwater
pumping under Article X, Section 2, percolating groundwater rights holders
would not have reasonably anticipated that Board authority was a limitation on
their property rights. In other words, Board regulation would not have
historically been part of the bundle of sticks that made up their groundwater
rights.
The legislature’s adoption of requirements for sustainable groundwater
management and allocation has granted new powers to the Board to regulate
136
percolating groundwater pumping that did not exist before. Legislators working
on the bills made a concerted effort to make the state stronger in its role as water
137
manager. Under SGMA, the Board may now limit pumping even though the
138
authority to do so largely did not exist before the enactment of the new laws.
Take, for example, the hypothetical case of an overlying landowner who
extracts percolating groundwater from a basin underneath the property and uses it
for farming. Assume further that this landowner is subject to the new
sustainability requirements, but a groundwater sustainability plan has not been
adopted for the basin. Under the law as it existed before SGMA, the Board would
not be authorized to interfere with this landowner’s use of percolating
139
groundwater. However, under the new legislation, the Board would be able to
140
step in and deem the basin as probationary because no plan was created. The
Board would then be able to adopt its own plans and limit that landowner’s
141
pumping.
Therefore, at least in this one scenario, it is likely that the legislature has
indeed expanded the Board’s jurisdiction This remains true even if one accepts
135. CAL. WATER CODE § 1201.
136. See supra Part III (detailing the shift in authority).
137. See SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (stating in the legislative findings section that
“[g]roundwater management will not be effective unless local actions to sustainably manage groundwater . . .
are taken,” and that in order to do so, “robust conjunctive management” and state “authority to develop and
implement an interim plan” will be necessary).
138. Compare WATER § 1200 (stating that “whenever the [term] . . . water occurs in relation to
applications to appropriate water or permits or licenses issued pursuant to such applications, such [term] refers
only to surface water, and to subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.”), with
WATER §§ 10735.2–10735.8 (allowing for adoption of interim plans for “probationary” basins without any
reference to whether percolating groundwater is exempt from coverage).
139. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (impliedly exempting percolating groundwater from coverage under
the Water Code).
140. Id. § 10735.2(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 347).
141. Id. § 10735.4(c) (enacted by Chapter 347).
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the argument that such action on the part of the landowner is unreasonable,
because as far as the State Board is concerned, landowners in California have
historically been left alone to do what they wish with the percolating
143
groundwater sitting underneath their properties.
B. Water Rights are Property Rights in California
According to the California Supreme Court, “courts typically classify water
144
rights in an underground basin as overlying, appropriative, or prescriptive.”
Overlying rights are landowner rights to use groundwater on their own
145
properties. Appropriative rights depend on a surplus of water and these rights
holders may only take that groundwater that is “not needed for the reasonable
146
beneficial use of those having prior rights.” Prescriptive rights arise where
wrongful appropriative pumping of non-surplus groundwater takes place openly
and notoriously for a continuous period of time, much like adverse possession of
147
real property.
148
All of these groundwater rights are property rights. Like all water rights in
California, groundwater rights are usufructuary, which means that owners have a
“legal right to use the water,” but hold “no right of private ownership” in the
149
corpus of the water itself. However, the fact that a property right is a

142. See Imperial Irrigation, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1163 (stating that “the Board has adjudicatory power in
the matter of unreasonable use of water.”); see also Allen v. Cal. Water & Tel. Co., 29 Cal. 2d 466, 484 (noting
that “[t]he amount of water required to irrigate . . . lands should . . . be determined by reference to the system
used”); see also Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1488 (2014) (holding that
“[w]hat constitutes an unreasonable use of water changes with circumstances, including the passage of time.”)
These authorities, when put together, permit an argument that the overlying landowner in the above
hypothetical is using an unreasonable amount of water under the circumstances.
143. CAL. WATER CODE § 1200; Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, 222 (1886); Light, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1463.
144. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1240 (2000).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1241.
147. Id.
148. See Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 392 (1886) (stating that overlying water rights are property rights);
San Bernardino Valley Mun. Water Dist. v. Meeks & Daley Water Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 216, 221 (1964)
(noting that appropriative and prescriptive rights are property interests that begin to exist when certain
conditions are met); Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (stating that “the right of property in water is
usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use”) (emphasis deleted); N.
Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist., 147 Cal. App. 4th 555, 559 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing to
Smith v. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 126 (1895)) (recognizing that “water rights are a form of property and, as
such, are subject to establishment and loss”); Fullerton v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590,
598 (Ct. App. 1979) (standing for the proposition that, “[a]lthough there is no private property right in the
corpus of the water while flowing in the stream, the right to its use is classified as real property”); Locke v.
Yorba Irrigation Co., 35 Cal. 2d 205, 211 (1950) (stating that “[w]ater rights are a species of real property”);
Adamson v. Black Rock Power & Irrigation Co., 12 F. 2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1926) (noting that the proposition
“[t]hat a water right is real property is well settled”).
149. See 62 CAL. JUR. 3D. Water § 373 (2015) (noting that “water rights holders have the right to take and
use water, but they do not own the water and cannot waste it”).
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usufructuary right does not mean that it is outside the protection of the Fifth
150
Amendment’s “takings” clause.
C. Applying the Doctrine of Regulatory Takings to Groundwater
This section details the law of regulatory takings and applies those principles
151
to the groundwater context. The United States Supreme Court has never ruled
on a takings case concerning California groundwater, but its takings cases have
152
established legal principles that guide application to groundwater. This section
examines cases that have addressed takings claims concerning California water
153
rights. Finally, this Comment concludes that SGMA itself does not result in a
taking of property, nor will many (or even most) forms of regulation under
SGMA, because a mere shift in regulatory jurisdiction from court-only to the
154
Board cannot itself result in a taking. Instead, a takings claim will only be
cognizable when a water right holder suffers a specific harm, such as limited
pumping, and that claim must specify a harm other than the Board’s new
assertion of jurisdiction, and the mere fact of some pumping limits would
155
probably not support a claim. There may be specific circumstances in which a
pumping limit disproportionately forces a property owner to bear a burden that
should be shared by the public, and in those circumstances, a takings claim could
156
be successful.
1. The Takings Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has a longstanding takings doctrine under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, in which the Court divides takings into
157
categories of “physical” and “regulatory” takings. Within these categories, the
Court has developed a standard for two kinds of “categorical” or “per se”
takings: one that applies “to physical invasions and direct appropriations of
property and complete wipeouts in value, even if those wipeouts were caused
158
solely by regulatory constraints,” and another that applies when governmental
159
action deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial or productive use.” If

150. See Schimmel v. Martin, 190 Cal. 429, 432 (characterizing the usufructuary right to use water as “a
right in real property,” as opposed to personal property).
151. See infra Parts IV.C.1–3.
152. See infra Part IV.C.1.
153. See infra Part IV.C.2.
154. See infra Part IV.C.3.
155. See infra Part IV.C.4.
156. See id (explaining the scenarios where a takings claim could be successful).
157. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
158. Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 271–72 (2013).
159. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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a regulation comes within either narrow category, a court should automatically
160
hold it to be a taking and award just compensation to the plaintiff.
In contrast, the analysis for whether a taking occurred as a result of less
extensive, albeit still significant, regulatory action is more complicated. In the
161
landmark case Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, the
Court outlined a case-by-case analysis that should apply to regulatory actions
162
interfering with private property interests. The Court’s test has three factors,
163
none of which is dispositive on its own. Courts must decide a takings question
based on: (1) the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” (2) the
“extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations” of the claimant, and (3) “the character of the governmental
164
action.”
165
Competing purposes help characterize the Court’s evolving doctrine. On
one hand, recognition of takings claims “bar[s] Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
166
borne by the public as a whole.” On the other hand, the government must retain
some ability to regulate, because “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
167
every such change in the general law.”
In the context of groundwater law, these competing interests will heavily
influence the discourse going forward because of the ongoing power struggle
168
between regulators and users. The state undoubtedly has an interest in
regulating groundwater pumping due to the negative impacts of unregulated
169
use. At the same time, however, rights holders have an equally weighted
170
interest in their historically-preserved rights, and the agricultural industry will
work to maximize profits by providing irrigation for as many crops as legally
171
possible.

160. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 124.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Owen, supra note 158, at 272.
166. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
167. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
168. See infra Part I (describing the conflict between those who pump and those who protect).
169. See SB 1168, 2014 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2014) (finding that “[e]xcessive groundwater pumping
can cause overdraft, failed wells, deteriorated water quality, environmental damage, and irreversible land
subsidence . . .”).
170. See Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, 222 (1886) (holding that “[w]ater percolating in the soil belongs to
the owner of the freehold.”).
171. See CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS REVIEW, 2013–2014,
at 5 (2014) (noting that California leads the nation in the production of over 70 crops, despite the current
conditions of extreme drought and groundwater overdraft).
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2. Water Rights Takings Cases from California
This section reviews California and federal takings law in the context of
172
groundwater. Two U.S. Federal Claims Court cases applying California water
law help illustrate how a California state court could recognize compensation for
173
interference with certain rights. In the first case, Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District v. United States, a group of plaintiffs claimed their right to use
water had been taken from them when the federal government imposed water use
174
restrictions under the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs reasoned that the
government had placed the costs of protecting local endangered species solely on
175
their shoulders. The Court of Federal Claims found in favor of the plaintiffs,
recognizing that “a mere restriction on use—the hallmark of a regulatory
action—completely eviscerates the right itself since plaintiffs’ sole entitlement is
176
to the use of the water.”
In the second case, Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, a
different regulatory agency attempted to curtail rights holders’ water use under
177
the Endangered Species Act. The rights holders brought suit alleging that their
178
water rights had been taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The
government conceded that, under California water law, the plaintiff had a “valid
179
property right in the water in question.” The court went on to state that an
application of the doctrine of physical takings was appropriate and remanded to
180
the lower court to determine whether a taking had actually occurred. Thus,
under California’s current water rights’ framework, courts would act well within
the limits of the law by granting compensable takings awards in certain
circumstances.
Contrary to this rationale, at least one California court has held that
governmental regulation of groundwater in the permitting context does not come
within either category of per se takings, nor does it constitute a taking under
181
Penn Central. In Allegretti & Company v. County of Imperial, a landowner
alleged that the Board’s requirement to obtain a permit for certain groundwater

172. See infra Part IV.C.2.
173. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001); Casitas Mun. Water
Dist. v. U.S., 543 F. 3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
174. Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 314.
175. Id. at 316.
176. Id. at 319; see also Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 407 (1931) (stating that “the
petitioner’s right was the use of water; and when all the water that it used was withdrawn from the petitioner’s
mill and turned elsewhere by [the] government . . . it is hard to see what more the [g]overnment could do to take
that use”).
177. Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d at 1282.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1295.
180. Id. at 1296–97.
181. Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1267 (2006).
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drilling activities and comply with reporting standards amounted to a taking.
Despite recognizing that California’s Constitution allows a taking when “land is
taken . . . for public use” and that “[t]he paradigmatic taking requiring just
compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of
183
private property,” the court held that “imposition of a . . . condition limiting the
total quantity of groundwater available for . . . use” could not be a physical
184
taking. The court also held that state intervention with groundwater resources
does not constitute a total “deprivation of economically beneficial or productive
use” because owners may still use the overlying land for farming and other
185
financially gainful purposes.
Further, the Allegretti court did not see interference with groundwater rights
as a taking under the ad hoc Penn Central test, because the economic impact was
reasonable, and the landowner had no “distinct, as opposed to abstract,
186
[investment-backed] expectations.” The court did not view the landowner’s
interest in the anticipated profits when buying the farm as compensable because
it believed that a landowner’s missed economic opportunity should not take away
from the state’s power to regulate under both the police power and of the court’s
187
understanding of Article X, Section 2. The Allegretti case is the only California
188
case to examine whether regulation of an overlying landowner is a taking.
An older case suggests that the Allegretti court’s reasoning was not entirely
189
novel. In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, the California Supreme
Court held that a compensable interest in water is rooted in reasonable use, and
190
thus, regulation of unreasonable uses cannot constitute a taking. Although not
dealing directly with groundwater, the Court concluded that no takings claim
arises when the state regulates an unreasonable use, because property owners are
191
not entitled to use their water unreasonably. Thus, although the Allegretti court
did not need to cite to Joslin to reach its conclusion, the case law in California
demonstrates a trend of opposition to recognizing takings claims for regulation of
192
water resources.

182. Id.
183. Id. at 1269–70.
184. Id. at 1273.
185. Id. at 1276.
186. Id. at 1277.
187. Id. at 1279.
188. Id. at 1267.
189. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132 (1967).
190. Id. at 144–46.
191. Id.
192. See Allegretti & Co., 138 Cal. App. 4th 1261 (holding that property owners do not have a property
right in groundwater resources and making no reference to Joslin); see also Joslin, 67 Cal. 2d (opposing a
takings claim where regulation is to prohibit unreasonable uses).
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3. Creation of New Jurisdiction Alone is Likely Insufficient to Support a
Takings Claim
Generally, when a state decides to allocate private resources for public
purposes, such action necessitates a discussion of takings and just
193
compensation. That principle begs the question of whether a shift in
jurisdiction is equal to a state action for condemnation of private interests
sufficient to create a facial takings claim.
Case law answers this question in the negative. For example, in United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the principle that
“the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not
194
constitute a regulatory taking.” The plaintiffs alleged that the United States
Army Corps of Engineers had effectuated a taking by extending its regulatory
195
authority to previously unregulated property. The Supreme Court confirmed
that mere extension of regulatory authority does not, by itself, result in a
196
compensable taking.
In California, the road is even rockier for a facial claim because courts
generally reason that the ability to regulate groundwater use for public benefit
197
comes “within the sphere of the [state’s] police power.” This notion could
arguably take regulation of groundwater out of the takings conversation
198
altogether. In People v. Murrison, the Third District Court of Appeal applied
this police power rationale to restrictions imposed on an alleged pre-1914 right
199
holder who was diverting stream water for irrigation purposes. In doing so, it
noted that “[l]egislation with respect to water affects the public welfare and the
right to legislate in regard to its use and conservation is referable to the police
power of the state” and that “[w]ater rights have been the subject of pervasive
200
regulation in California.” Ultimately, the Murrison court held that:
where the government merely regulates the use of property,
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose of
the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the
economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly

193. 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 1252 (3d ed. 1947).
194. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
195. Id. at 123.
196. Id. at 126.
197. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743 (1976).
198. See id. (stating that “it is established beyond dispute” that regulations based on the California
Constitution are valid exercises of the police power, and citing to Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d
132 (1967) in support of the police power rationale).
199. People v. Murrison, 101 Cal. App. 4th 349, 354–55 (2002).
200. Id. at 360.
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singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by
201
the public as a whole.
One final consideration for regulatory takings is the question of whether
“background principles” of state law limit a takings claim for pumping limits
202
under SGMA. In Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, the U.S. Supreme
Court noted that the state does not owe compensation if the regulation simply
reiterates the restrictions that the “background principles” of the state’s property
203
law already place upon ownership. Because of this statement, the question
becomes whether California’s background principles of groundwater law already
dictate that unsustainable use is unreasonable. On the one hand, the California
courts have long recognized the Board’s regulatory power to prescribe
204
unreasonable uses, and unsustainable pumping could fit within the meaning of
“unreasonable.” That would be a background principle likely to prevent
compensation. Another, and perhaps more definitive question, is whether any
entity had the authority to impose pumping cuts on percolating groundwater
users prior to SGMA; if the users were subject to limits from another source prior
to SGMA, then perhaps it doesn’t matter that the Board has not historically had
the power to issue those limits. In this regard, the courts have always had the
power to limit pumping to prevent overdraft and to ensure that pumping is within
205
the “safe yield” of a basin. Because SGMA’s definition of sustainable use
206
essentially mirrors the common law “safe yield” definition, the best conclusion
seems to be that pumping limits to achieve a safe yield have always been part of
a landowner’s so-called bundle of sticks. In other words, the potential for such
limits has always been inherent in the water right.
4. “As Applied” Takings
Although reduction of pumping under SGMA is unlikely to support a viable
takings claim in many instances, there may be a few specific scenarios in which
regulation raises the specter of takings. First, there should be a cognizable takings
claim if SGMA results in limits on individual riparian or overlying rights holders
who pump from isolated aquifers that do not contribute to the problems of
unsustainable groundwater pumping and overdraft.

201. Id. at 363.
202. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
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204. See supra Part II.B.4 (outlining the cases demonstrating the regulatory authority of the Board when
it comes to addressing unreasonable use).
205. Safe Yield, WATER EDUC. FOUND., http://www.watereducation.org/aquapedia/safe-yield (last visited
September 7, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
206. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(v) (enacted by Chapter 346) (defining “sustainable yield” as the
“maximum quantity of water . . . that can be withdrawn annually . . . without causing an undesirable result”).

47

2015 / Rough Waters
Second, a takings claim might succeed where SGMA limits deprive a water
user of all economically beneficial use of their water rights. The Lucas court held
that, “when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave
207
his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.” Of course, this
argument depends in part on what is required of the water user and how the right
is defined—if the user is limited in critically dry years, but not every year, such
regulation would likely withstand a takings claim.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout California’s storied history as a leading agricultural producer,
each branch of the government has worked to keep the state’s groundwater law
208
current with evolving demands.
Now, as the legislature pushes for
sustainability and confers new authority on the Board, it is important to keep the
longstanding framework in mind. The Board now has a scope of authority that is
209
larger than before. Although such pumping limits are likely desirable from an
environmental and policy perspective, this substantial legal change raises
important questions about whether the government is overreaching in the scope
of its impact on private property in the name of public benefit, at least without
compensation. As described herein, this mere shift in jurisdiction is unlikely to
support a viable takings claim; however, there may be some limited, specific
circumstances in which state interference “goes too far” and results in a
210
compensable taking.
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